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COMMENTS
THE EMERGING CONSTITUTIONAL PRIVILEGE TO
CONCEAL CONFIDENTIAL NEWS SOURCES
In furtherance of the national interest in an informed populace, the
American press has evolved into a sophisticated and complex system
of news reporting that is universal in scope. Although methods of
accumulating and disseminating data have changed with technological
advancement, the people have continued to be the primary source of
news reports. Communications from source to media frequently are
conducted in confidence, with the anonymity of the informant being
a condition precedent to disclosure of the information. Legal problems
develop when the newsman is called upon to reveal the identity of his
confidential source in a judicial or legislative fact-finding proceeding.
Historically, the courts have not recognized any common law privilege to conceal news sources" and consistently have ordered disclosure,
often using criminal contempt as a mode of enforcement.2 With the
exception of the few states that have adopted privilege statutes,3 most
jurisdictions have failed to respond to any arguments proposed in support of a newsman's privilege.4
1 8 J. 'VIGMORE, EVIDENcE § 2286 (McNaughton rev. 1961); 58 Am. JUR. Witnesses § 546
(1948); 97 CJS. Witnesses § 259 (1957).

2 See, e.g., Brewster v. Boston Herald-Traveler Corp., 20 F.R.D. 416 (D. Mass. 1957);

Ex parte Lawrence, 116 Cal. 298, 48 P. 124 (1897); People v. Durrant, 116 Cal. 179,
48 P. 75 (1897); Joslyn v. People, 67 Colo. 297, 184 P. 375 (1919); Clein v. State, 52
So. 2d 117 (Fla. 1950); Plunkett v. Hamilton, 136 Ga. 72, 70 S.E. 781 (1911); Pledger
v. State, 77 Ga. 242, 3 S.E. 320 (1887); State v. Donovan, 129 N.J.L. 478, 30 A.2d

421 (1943); In re Grunow, 84 N.J.L. 235, 85 A. 1011 (1913); People ex rel. Mooney v.
Sheriff, 269 N.Y. 291, 199 N.E. 415 (1936). See also Annor., 7 A.L.R.3d 591 (1966).

3At least twelve states now have statutes protecting the newsman's confidential
sources. ALA. CODE tit. 7, § 370 (1960); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2237 (1956); ARK.
STAT. ANN. § 43-917 (1964); CAL. Evm. CODE § 1070 (West 1966); IND. STAT. ANN.
52-1733 (1968); Ky. REv. STAT. §421.100 (1969); LA. REv. STAT. §45:1451-54 (Supp.
1971); MD. CODE ANN. art. 35, § 2 (1971); MONT. REv. CODE § 93-601-2 (1964); N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 20-1-12.1 (1970); OHto REv. CODE ANN. §§ 2739.04, 2739.12 (Supp. 1970);
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 28, § 2A:84A-21 (1970).
4 The primary arguments advanced in favor of a journalistic privilege to conceal

sources have included: (1) Code of Ethics (2) forfeiture of estate (3) employer's
regulations (4) relevance and (5) self-incrimination. See D'Alemberte, Journalists Under
the Axe: Protectionof Confidential Sources of Information, 6 HARv. J. LEis. 307, 314-22
(1969).
[1291
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Recently, however, reporters have contended that a privilege not to
reveal confidential news sources is protected by the first amendment
guarantee of freedom of the press. Having some promise of success
from the beginning; 5 the argument for a constitutionally based privilege
has gained momentum following its recent adoption by the Ninth Circuit. The purpose of this Comment is to evaluate the constitutional
privilege to conceal confidential news sources, as expressed in Caldwell
v. United States," and to assess the probable impact of that decision upon
the further development of a journalistic privilege.
I.

THE FIRST AMENDMENT AS A BASIS FOR THE NEWSMAN's PRIVILEGE

Although the United States Supreme Court has never ruled on the
issue of the newsman's constitutional privilege, 7 it has consistently mainThe newsman's Code of Ethics forbids disclosure of confidential sources before judicial
or investigatory bodies. However, the courts have uniformly held that ethical considerations must yield when in conflict with the interests of justice. See Clein v. State,
52 So. 2d 117 (Fla. 1950); In re Wayne, 4 Hawaii Dist. Ct. 475 (1914).
The contention that forced disclosure renders the reporter unable to collect information and ultimately results in loss of his job has not been successful. This argument
is akin to an equally fruitless objection that disclosure violates the newsman's rules
of employment. See Plunkett v. Hamilton, 136 Ga. 72, 70 S.E. 781 (1911); People ex
rel. Phelps v. Fancher, 2 Hun 226 (N.Y. 1874). See also In re Wayne, 4 Hawaii Dist.
Ct. 475 (1914).
Disclosure has not been required where the identity of the confidential source has
been shown to be irrelevant and immaterial to the proceedings. See Rosenberg v. Carroll, 99 F. Supp. 629 (S.D.N.Y. 1951). On the other hand, where the information might
lead to the discovery of admissable evidence, disclosure has been ordered. See Brewster
v. Boston Herald-Traveler Corp., 20 F.R.D. 416 (D. Mass. 1957); In re Goodfader, 45
Hawaii 317, 367 P.2d 472 (1961). But see Garland v. Torre, 259 F.2d 545 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 358 U.S. 910 (1958) (confidential information went to the "heart of
plaintiffs claim").
As a witness, the newsman may refuse to answer any question which may tend to
incriminate him. However, there is only one case in which a journalist has invoked the
fifth amendment privilege to avoid disclosure of his source. See Burdick v. United
States, 236 U.S. 79 (1915). See also Joslyn v. People, 67 Colo. 297, 184 P. 375 (1919)
(counsel advised newsman of privilege against self-incrimination but reporter chose
not to exercise the right).
5
See Garland v. Torre, 259 F.2d 545 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 910 (1958);
In re Goodfader, 45 Hawaii 317, 367 P.2d 472 (1961).
6 434 F.2d 1081 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. granted, 91 S.Ct. 1616 (1971).
7 The Supreme Court on three occasions has refused to review the question of a newsman's constitutional privilege to conceal his sources. Garland v. Torre, 259 F.2d 545
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 910 (1958), Murphy v. Colorado, 365 US. 843 (1961)
(cert. denied); State v. Buchanan, 436 P.2d 729 (Ore.), cert. denied, 392 U.S. 905 (1968).
However, as this paper goes to press, certiorari has been granted in the Caldwell
case. See note 6 supra.
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tained that freedom of-the press must be liberally extended8 in order to
advance the "spectrum of available knowledge." 9 Free press is said to
rest on the "assumption that the widest possible dissemination of information from diverse and antagonistic sources is essential to the welfare
of the public, [and] that a free press is a condition of a free society." 10
Compulsory disclosure of confidential news sources before a legislative or judicial proceeding causes an abridgement of the freedom of the
press primarily by imposing a significant practical restraint upon the
flow of information from source to news media, and consequently upon
the flow of news to the public who have a right to be informed. Opponents of the privilege maintain that any effect on the flow of news is
entirely speculative."1 Indirect restraints upon liberty are often indefi8 See, e.g., Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945); Bridges v. California,
314 U.S. 252 (1941); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940); Near v. Minnesota,
283 U.S. 697 (1931).
The Supreme Court in Bridges v. California declared that "the unqualified prohibitions
laid down by the framers were intended to give to liberty of the press, as to the other
liberties, the broadest scope that could be countenanced in an orderly society." 314
U.S. 252, 265 (1941).
Freedom of the press exists "to preserve an untrammeled press as a vital source of
To allow it to be fettered is to fetter ourselves." Grosjean v.
public information ....
American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 250 (1936).
9
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482 (1965).
10 Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945).
11 The primary objection to recognition of a constitutional newsman's privilege has
been that forced disclosure has no effect upon the flow of information to the public,
and therefore does not in fact abridge the freedom of the press. The following language
of the New York Law Revision Commission is often cited in this regard:
[T]he present absence of a privilege to newsmen does not infringe on freedom
of the press. There is no more infringment of constitutional rights in compelling
a newsman to disclose the sources of his information than there is in compelling
any other person to make a disclosure. No limitation whatever on the right to
publish is imposed.
ANN. REP. 27. This statement was based on a finding
1949 N.Y. LAW REvisioN Com_ x'N
of no perceptible difference in the flow of news in states having journalists' privilege

statutes than in states providing no such sanction. 1949 N.Y. LAw REvisioN COMM'N
ANN. RaP. 35.

Other attacks upon the proposed constitutional privilege have been less convincing.
Some student material has pointed to the paucity of cases in which the issue has been
raised as supporting the position that forced disclosure does not impede the flow of
news. See Comment, Compulsory Disclosure of a Newsmam's Source: A Compromise
Proposal,54 Nw. U.L. REv. 243, 246-47 & n.23 (1959); 82 HARv. L. REv. 1384, 1386 (1969);
61 MIcH. L. REv. 184, 189 (1962). Others have insisted that since practically without
exception newsmen have been willing to go to jail rather than disclose their source, the
privilege is unnecessary. See Note, The Right of a Newsman to Refrain from Divulging the Sources of His Information, 36 VA. L. Rav. 61 (1950); Comment, Confi-
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nite,' - but it is well established that indirect as well as direct restraints
may interfere with constitutional freedoms.13 Although it is admittedly
impossible to calculate the number of potential sources who fail to come
forward because of the threat of disclosure, knowledge of human nature suggests that some reticence results. Forced disclosure has no im-

mediate effect upon the news flow, but its potential consequence is
14
substantial.
First amendment freedoms, however, are not absolute rights. 5 Where

an otherwise valid exercise of governmental or legislative power results
in an infringement of first amendment rights, the respective interests in-

volved must be balanced.1 Specifically, the public interest in the power
to compel testimony in a particular case must be of sufficient public
importance to justify the encroachment upon freedom of the press resulting from forced disclosure. 17
Traditionally, the power of courts to compel testimony in the interest
of discovering truth has been attributed immense public importance,'
as is evidenced by the infrequence of privileged relationships at common
dentiality of News Sources Under the First Amendment, 11 STAN. L. REv. 541 (1959);
82 HARV. L. REv. 1384 (1969).
12 The Supreme Court has protected anonymity where compelling disclosure of group
affiliations would entail the "likelihood" of imposing a restraint upon the exercise of
the first amendment freedom of association. NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357
U.S. 449,462 (1958).
13 "Freedoms such as these [speech, press, and association] are protected not only
against heavy-handed frontal attack, but also from being stifled by more subtle governmental interference." Bates v. Little Rock, 361 US. 516, 523 (1960). See Shelton
v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960); United States v. Rumely, 345 US. 41 (1953);
American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950); Winters v. New
York, 333 U.S. 507 (1948). Cf. Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 249 (1936).
14 See Guest & Stanzler, The Constitutional Argument for Newsmen Concealing
Their Sources, 64 Nw. U.L. REv. 18 (1969).
15 See, e.g., Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36, 49-51 (1961); Watkins v. United
States, 354 U.S. 178, 198 (1957); American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382,
399 (1950).
16See, e.g., Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36 (1961); Bates v. Little Rock, 361
U.S. 516 (1960); Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109 (1959).
17See, e.g., Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234 (1957); Garland v. Torre, 259
F.2d 545 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 358 US. 910 (1958).
18 The duty of a witness to testify in a judicial or legislative proceeding has been
considered an incident to the judicial power of the United States. See United States
v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323 (1950); Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421 (1932); Blair
v. United States, 250 U.S. 273 (1919); Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361 (1911);
Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1906).

1971]

COMMENTS

law.' 9 Where the right to "every man's evidence" 20 conflicts with first
amendment freedoms, a delicate and difficult task of balancing must be
employed. 21
The prospect of a newsman's constitutional privilege has gained substantial support in decisions protecting anonymity where the first amendment freedom of expression has been threatened.2 2 In these cases, the fear
of public exposure experienced by members of various controversial
minority groups has been recognized as an important human influence,
which in some circumstances merits protection in order to secure the
free exercise of first amendment rights. It follows from the reasoning
employed therein that compelling disclosure of confidential sources discourages expression of radical or unpopular views through the news
media, and therefore has a chilling effect 23 upon the source's exercise of
his first amendment guarantee of freedom of expression. Moreover, as
freedom of expression through the news media is curtailed, the unencumbered flow of news to the public is repressed in like degree, thereby
constituting an abridgment of freedom of the press. The infringement
occasioned by compulsory disclosure upon the aggregate and intertwined
19 Only the confidential communications between physician and patient, lawyer and
client, husband and wife, and priest and penitent were privileged at common law. See
State v. Buchanan, 436 P.2d 729, 730, n.4 (Ore.), cert. denied, 392 U.S. 905 (1968);
MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE 22-30 (1942) (Foreword by E. Morgan). Generally, a witness
properly summoned must testify. Any variance from the rule is distinctly exceptional.
8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 2190-92 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
20 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2192 (McNaughton rev. 1961)

(quoting Lord Hard-

wicke).
21 Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 161 (1939).
22
See, e.g., DeGregory v. Attorney General, 383 U.S. 825 (1966); Gibson v. Florida
Legislative Investigation Comm., 372 U.S. 539 (1963); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 US. 479
(1960); Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60 (1960); NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson,
357 U.S. 449 (1958); United States v. Rumely, 345 U.S. 41 (1953) (Douglas, J., concurring). See generally Note, The Constitutional Right to Anonymity: Free Speech,
Disclosure and the Devil, 70 YALE LJ. 1084, 1101-13 (1961); 82 HARv. L. REV. 1384,
1388-90 (1969).
23 The recent articulation of the "chilling effect" concept in constitutional law has
had a substantial impact in the area of first amendment freedoms. Both procedural and
substantive modifications have resulted from the recognition of a "duty to insulate all
individuals from the 'chilling effect' upon exercise of First Amendment freedoms . .. "
Walker v. Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307, 345 (1967) (Brennan, J., dissenting). See cases
cited notes 12 & 22 supra. For an excellent note on the concept of chilling as it has
affected first amendment rights, see Note, The Chilling Effect in Constitutional Law, 69
CoLum. L. REv. 808, 822-26 (1969).
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freedoms of press and expression justifies recognition of a first amendment privilege to conceal confidential news sources.24
The argument for a constitutionally based newsman's privilege to
conceal confidential sources was first employed in Garland v. Torre.25
In a suit against the Columbia Broadcasting Company, a columnist was
subpoenaed to reveal the source of alleged libelous remarks published in
her gossip column. She refused to disclose and was cited for contempt.
The Second Circuit 6 assumed for purposes of deciding the case that
freedom of the press was involved, but upheld the contempt conviction
since the desired testimony "went to the heart of plaintiff's claim." 27
Significantly, the Garlandcourt observed that it was not dealing with a
situation involving wholesale disclosure of sources, nor with a case in
which the identity of the source was of doubtful relevance.2"
Hawaii next encountered the dilemma in In re Goodfader.- A former
personnel director of the Civil Service Commission of Honolulu instituted suit against members of that body who allegedly precipitated her
discharge through an illegal conspiracy. A newspaper reporter admitted having prior knowledge of the dismissal, but refused to reveal
his source. The Supreme Court of Hawaii ordered disclosure of the
30 the
source of information. Although ostensibly relying upon Garland,
Goodfader court actually departed from the spirit of that decision and,
for practical purposes, eliminated any balancing of conflicting interests.
24

Makeweight arguments may also be advanced that compulsory disclosure induces
self-censorship among reporters and impairs the autonomy of the news media, but these
are of little practical significance and are not essential to the existence of the constitutional basis for privilege. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279
(1964); Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147 (1959); Caldwell v. United States, 434 F.2d
1081 (9th Cir. 1970).
25 259 F.2d 545 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 910 (1958). The journalist contended that to compel reporters to disclose their confidential sources would encroach
upon the freedom of the press guaranteed by the first amendment because "it would
impose an important practical restraint on the flow of news from news sources to
news media and would thus diminish pro tanto the flow of news to the public." Id.
at 547-48.
26 The opinion was recited by Judge (now Mr. Justice) Stewart.
27 Garland v. Torre, 259 F.2d 545, 550 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 910 (1958).
28 Id. at 549.
29 45 Hawaii 317, 367 P.2d 472 (1961).
30 Garland v. Torre, 259 F.2d 545 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 910 (1958).
The Goodfader court followed Garland in that it assumed for purposes of the suit
that compulsory disclosure of confidential new sources infringes upon the freedom of
the press. In re Goodfader, 45 Hawaii 317, 324, 367 P.2d 472, 480 (1961).
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The interest in compelling testimony was considered predominant s as
the court required only that the informant's identity be relevant in order
to justify mandatory disclosure.32
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court summarily held in In re Taylor

3 that

"by no stretch of language" u could a privilege to conceal sources fall
within the protection of the first amendment. Subsequently, in State v.
Buohanana the highest court of Oregon took a rather unique position
in ordering the reporter to disclose his source. The court held that freedom of the press exists for the public and does not confer special constitutional privileges upon members of the press."' It is to be noted that
the reporter based her argument solely upon her right to collect news,
but failed to emphasize the practical importance of nondisclosure to an
untrammeled flow of news to the public.
The foregoing cases indicate the general confusion that has characterized the development of a constitutionally based privilege to conceal
confidential news sources. They also serve to accentuate the impact
of the recent Ninth Circuit decision of Caldwell v. United StateS37 upon
that privilege.
II. JUDICIAL RECOGNITION OF THE NEwsMAN's PRIVILEGE'

In the Caldwell case, a federal grand jury investigating possible criminal activities of the Black Panther Party issued a subpoena commanding
31 The Goodfader court cited out of context the following language from the
Garlandcase:
If an additional First Amendment liberty-the freedom of the press-is here involved, we do not hesitate to conclude that it too must give place under the
Constitution to a paramount public interest in the fair administration of justice.
Garland v. Torre, 259 F.2d 545, 549 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 358 US. 910 (1958).
This language, divorced from the strong implication in Garland that the public interest
in the fair administration of justice may only be paramount where the identity of the
source goes to the heart of the plaintiff's claim, offers some explanation for the holding
in 32
Goodfader.
There was one dissent on the grounds that the informant's identity in this case
not only did not go to the heart of the plaintiff's claim, but also was of doubtful
relevance and inadmissible as hearsay. in re Goodfader, 45 Hawaii 317, 367 P.2d 472
(1961) (Mizuha, J., dissenting).
33 412 Pa. 32, 193 A.2d 181 (1963).
34 Id. at 35, 193 A.2d at 184.
35 436 P.2d 729 (Ore.), cert. denied, 392 U.S. 905 (1968).
36 The court correctly decided the issue as it was presented. See, e.g., Tribune Review
Publishing Co. v. Thomas, 254 F.2d 893 (3d Cir. 1958); Brumfield v. State, 108 So. 2d
33 (Fla. 1958); United Press Ass'n v. Valente, 308 N.Y. 71, 123 NE.2d 777 (1954).
37 434 F.2d 1081 (9th Cir. 1970).
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Earl Caldwell, a New York Times reporter, to appear and testify. Caldwell maintained that the issuance of a district court order granting him

a qualified privilege" was not sufficient to safeguard the constitutional
freedoms at stake because his mere appearance would jeopardize the
first amendment guarantee of freedom of the press.
The Ninth Circuit held that the first amendment extends to newsmen
the privilege of concealing confidential sources until there is demon-

strated a compelling and overriding interest that otherwise cannot be
served.

9

Furthermore, where attendance before a grand jury proceed-

ing jeopardizes the public's first amendment right to be informed, the
compelling need for the witness' presence must be shown before a sub-

poena might properly issue. 40 Noting the unique bond of trust that Caldwell had established with the Black Panthers, and the peculiar sensitivity
of that group to functions of the "establishment," the court directed

that Caldwell need not appear before the grand jury because an unjustifiable injury to the freedom of the press would result.
Caldwell is the first case to recognize unequivocably a constitutionally
based newsman's privilege to conceal confidential sources. 41 For reasons
38 The protective order of the district court provided in pertinent part as follows:
(1) That [Caldwell] . .. shall not be required to reveal confidential associations,
sources or information received, developed or maintained by him as a professional
journalist in the course of his efforts to gather news for dissemination to the
public through the press or other news media.
(2) That specifically without limiting paragraph (1), Mr. Caldwell shall not be
required to answer questions concerning statements made to him for information
given to him by members of the Black Panther Party unless such statements or
information were given to him for publication or public disclosure; ....
Application of Caldwell, 311 F. Supp. 358, 362 (N.D. Cal. 1970). The described privilege
is qualified in that the order is subject to modification upon a showing by the Government of a compelling national interest in the testimony which cannot be otherwise
served. The United States did not contest this order on appeal to the Ninth Circuit.
Judge Zirpoli has again issued a protective order substantially identical to the one
set out above in the more recent case of In re Grand Jury Witnesses, 322 F. Supp. 573
(N..
Cal. 1970). Professional journalists employed by a militant organization's
newspaper were called upon to testify before a grand jury when it was discovered that
they had associated with persons advocating murder and destruction in the overthrow
of the Government. The court ordered the journalists to testify, holding that an overriding national interest in the testimony outweighed any first amendment rights of
association that the witnesses as individuals may have as well as any journalistic privilege
in the area of free press to which they might be entitled. It is rather curious that no
mention of the Caldwell case was made in the opinion.
39 Caldwell v. United States, 434 F.2d 1081, 1086 (9th Cir. 1970).
40 Id. at 1089.
41 Two prior decisions had assumed but not decided that the freedom of the press
sanctions a privilege for newsmen. See Garland v. Torre, 259 F2d 545 (2d Cir.), cert.
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discussed previously in this Comment, such recognition is long overdue.
Other important aspects of the decision now require analysis in order to
assess its probable significance.
As Caldwell involved grand jury proceedings rather than private
litigation,4 the Caldwell court adopted a qualification upon the reporter's privilege from analogous cases limiting interrogation in legislative proceedings where the first amendment freedom of association was
threatened. 4 3 Consequently, under Caldwell the reporter may be forced
to reveal confidential information only upon demonstration of a compelling national interest in the testimony that otherwise cannot be
served. Although cast in language appropriate to grand jury procedure,
the Caldwell qualification upon the newsman's privilege is substantially
the same as the "heart of the plaintiff's claim" requirement set out in
Garland44 for use in private litigation.
In affirming the lower court's protective order,45 the Caldwell court
adopted a newsman's privilege that extends not only to the confidential
source but to confidential information as well. To the extent that its
holding protects confidential information, the Caldwell decision is unsound. The journalist's privilege is desirable to protect the source who
prefers anonymity so that he will not be reluctant in communicating information to the media for dissemination to the public. On the other
hand, communications from news source to media by their nature contemplate public disclosure of the information. As long as the informant
may freely come forward with news, the free flow of news to the public
is secured. If the reporter wishes to conceal any of the information for
personal reasons or as a favor to his source, he must do so at his perilthere is no constitutional basis for protecting the concealment of information obtained by the newsman.
In the overwhelming majority of situations, it is the forced disclosure
of confidential sources rather than the reporter's appearancebefore the
grand jury which infringes upon first amendment liberties. Presented
denied, 358 US. 910 (1958); In re Goodfader, 45 Hawaii 317, 367 P.2d 472 (1961).
42 See Garland v. Torte, 259 F.2d 545 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 910 (1958);
In re Goodfader, 45 Hawaii 317, 367 P.2d 472 (1961).
43
See, e.g, DeGregory v. Attorney General, 383 U.S. 825 (1966); Gibson v. Florida
Legislative Investigation Comm, 372 U.S. 539 (1963); NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958); Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234 (1957); Watkins v.
United States, 354 US. 178 (1957); United States v. Rumely, 345 US. 41 (1953).
44 Garland v. Torre, 259 F.2d 545 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 358 US. 910 (1958).
45 See note 38 supra.
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with an unusually broad grand jury investigation and Caldwell's peculiar
trust relationship with the extremely sensitive Black Panthers, the Caldwell court considered the reporter's appearance under the circumstances
no different than actual disclosure in its effect upon freedom of the press.
Consequently, the newsman's constitutional privilege was held to demand demonstration of a compelling need for the reporter's testimony
before appearance before the grand jury could be required.
In extending protection to appearance before the grand jury, the
Caldwell court emphasized that its holding was exceptional rather
than indicative of any general rule. Courts seeking guidance on the issue
of the newsman's privilege from the Caldwell decision hopefully will
realize that the rule in Caldwell is indeed a "narrow one," 46 and will
exercise temperance in application of its broad principles.
III. JUDICIAL REACTION TO CALDWELL

Subsequent to the Caldwell decision, two cases have dealt specifically
with the newsman's constitutional privilege to conceal confidential
sources. A possible indication of judicial reaction to the newsman's
constitutional privilege may be found therein.
In State v. KnopS4 7 a grand jury investigating an arson and fatal bombings on college campuses in Wisconsin issued a subpoena to the editor
of a local newspaper who had published an article on the bombers. The
editor's refusal to disclose his sources of information resulted in a contempt citation that was upheld on appeal. The Supreme Court of Wisconsin recognized a newsman's constitutionally protected privilege to
conceal his confidential sources, but found that the nature of the violent
crimes constituted an overriding state's interest in the witness' testimony.
Consequently, the first amendment interests involved were required to
yield to the paramount interest in the power of the grand jury to discover the truth through testimony.
This proper application of the principles underlying the Caldwell
decision indicates that Caldwell may have the desirable effect of reducing
judicial reluctance to recognize the existence of a constitutionally based
reporter's privilege. Such reaction to Caldwell would lead not only to
predictability of result in the area of the newsman's privilege, but more
importantly would put an end to the violation of constitutional rights.
However, possible misapplication of the broad principles of Caldwell
46

Caldwell v. United States, 434 F.2d 101, 1090 (9th Cir. 1970).

47 49 Wis. 2d 647, 183 N.~W.2d 93 (1971).
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is forecast in the concurring opinion in Knops: "We also hold, following Caldwell, as I understand the majority opinion, that the 'compelling
and overriding interest' of the state must be demonstrated to the court
48 In Knops,
as a prerequisite for the issuance of a subpoena ....,,
none of the special circumstances existed which were determinative in
Caldwell's extension of protection to appearance before the grand jury.
There was neither a peculiar trust relationship between source and reporter nor a singular sensitivity to activities of the news media short of
actual disclosure.
In order that the Cald'well decision not foster continued confusion in
the growing area of the newsman's constitutional privilege, it is imperative that the extension of constitutional protection to appearance before
the grand jury be recognized as justified only upon special facts. If
constitutional protection is extended to appearance before a grand jury
in all cases, the sound basis for the newsman's privilege at the point of
disclosure will become obscured. The result will be unnecessary confusion and expense in altering grand jury procedure to protect illusory
infringements upon first amendment freedoms.
On the other hand, the highest court of Massachusetts in In re Pappas49
has rejected the "broad conclusions" '0of the Caldwell decision as "judicial amendment of the Constitution." - A reporter who was allowed
to enter Black Panther headquarters during a civil disorder was subpoenaed to testify before a grand jury. Refusing to recognize a constitutional privilege for newsmen, the court held that judicial discretion
over inquiry is sufficient to protect the interests involved, and ordered
the reporter to disclose his confidential sources.
The principal obstacle to recognition of a newsman's privilege has
long been judicial reluctance in surrendering power over witnesses.5 2
In an effort to preserve that power, courts as in Pappas have refused to
recognize that freedom of the press is at stake in the area of forced disclosure of confidential news sources. Ironically, protection of freedom
of the press in this situation does not contemplate a wholesale sacrifice
of the power to compel testimony. Rather, the conflicting interests
under Cald'well are afforded both adequate protection and due recogni48 d.at 653,

183 N.W.2d at 99-100.

Mass.- , 266 N.E.2d 297 (1971).
50 Id.at -, 266 N.E.2d at 302.
511d.
52See Garland v. Torre, 259 F.2d 545 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 358 US. 910 (1958);
I
In re Goodfader, 45 Hawaii 317, 367 P.2d.472 (1961); notes 2 & 21-23 s7pra.
49-
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tion. The holding in Pappas indicates, however, that the development of
a constitutional newsman's privilege may continue to be repressed by

inherent prejudice toward any testimonial privilege.
IV.

CONCLUSION

It is unfortunate that the long awaited judicial recognition of a newsman's constitutional privilege to conceal his confidential sources should
find expression in the special circumstances of the Caldwell decision.
Convincing first amendment arguments against forced disclosure weaken
and become dependent upon unique circumstances when protection is
extended to a mere appearance before the grand jury. Moreover, in
affirming the district court's protective order, the Caldwell court adopted
a too liberal privilege which protects confidential information as well
as the confidential source. Only the privilege to conceal confidential
sources may be justified upon sound application of constitutional principles. If Caldwell is to promote acceptance of the constitutional newsman's privilege to conceal his confidential sources, rather than perpetuate
the confusion surrounding the issue, subsequent decisions must adopt
a reasonable interpretation of its underlying principles.5 3

I. W. P. III

53 Although this Comment has been confined to the judicial evolution of a newsman's
privilege to conceal his sources, it is appropriate to mention the prospect of privilege
by congressional act.
On March 23, 1971, Senator James B. Pearson of Kansas introduced a bill in the
Senate for the enactment of the "Newsmen's Privilege Act," S. 1311, 92d Cong, 1st
Sess. (1971).
The bill provides for a privilege against disclosure of both confidential information
and the sources of information obtained by newsmen. The proposed privilege is subject to the following qualifications:
First, the privilege does not apply to the source of any allegedly defamatory
information in a case where the defendant, in a civil action for defamation, asserts
a defense based upon the source of such information. Second, the privilege shall
not apply to the source of any information concerning the details of any grand
jury or other proceeding which was required to be secret under the laws of the
United States. Finally, the bill establishes procedures for divesting the privilege
when there is substantial evidence that disclosure of information held confidential
by the newsman is required to prevent a threat to human life, of espionage, or
of foreign aggression.
117 CONG. Rac. 41 (1971) (remarks of Senator Pearson).

